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«Bernd W. Kubbig Kontakt: Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung (DSF) Am Ledenhof 3-5 D-49074 Osnabrück Fon: +49.(0)541.600.35.42 Fax: ...»

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38 See Patrick J. Garrity, Does the Gulf War Still Matter? Foreign Perspectives on the War and the Future of International Security, CNSS Report No.16 (Los Alamos, NM: Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, March 1993).

deficient democracies in the cases of Turkey and even more so of Russia. The two additional explanatory factors – the role of military alliances such as NATO and geographical/geopolitical position of the democracies examined are secondary. In the final analysis it is the combination of the foreign policy orientations in connection with the particular domestic power constellations (in some cases strong economic and bureaucratic interests), the role of the US and the relevance of the perceived threats that account for a sceptical/critical or for a supportive MD policy (threats defined mostly as missiles from nondemocratic ad-versaries, but to a lesser extent as the United States menacing the basic foreign policy orientations of other democracies).

3. Prospects and Problems Ahead The incremental, continuous, but not so orderly introduction of a great variety of complex and new MD technologies, as well as the mental and strategic changes associated with it, are likely to have both promising and problematic impacts. It is interesting to note that a number of pressing problems have been mentioned especially by the Polish authors Domisiewicz/ Kamiński who are the most fervent MD supporters in this project. Virtually all of the issues raised by them, and in other contributions, apply to the Middle East/Persian

Gulf region and to Asia as well. To name the most relevant problems:

• MD technologies introduced in democracies have an impact on the decisionmaking processes in other democratic countries, and democratising or authoritarian neighbours. In the case of basing radars or interceptors on Central European territory, Russia in particular would be affected. What if Moscow chooses to obstruct those kinds of MD plans, establishes stronger ties with Beijing, intensifies its arms trade in the rocket area with problem states, bypasses arms control agreements, continues to intensify its arms build-up and aims its nuclear-tipped missiles at Polish strategic targets? Domisiewicz/Kamiński, in their thoughtful analysis, consider such developments as not inconceivable. They are indeed supported on this point by Kassianowa’s remarks, insofar as she considers it to be not yet determined which of the competing Russian MD-related strategies – oriented towards co-operation or confrontation – will prevail. (The likely prospect of a defence-offence arms race outside of Europe is underscored by Rajagopalan in the Indian-Pakistani context.)

• The bilateral MD track preferred by the United States could prove to be a challenge for the West European states and NATO, as it looks like the Alliance is being bypassed. Yet this form of determined bilateralism may result in a push for NATO in the MD area. Its feasibility studies on the territorial defence of Europe, addressed several times in this project, may be an occasion to discuss the issues of co-ordination between the American and the Alliance MD-related activities.

From the democratic point of view the issue of a probable challenge to parliamentary control needs to be debated in this context, too. 39

• Ecological and social risks are probably associated with the interception of an atomic, biological or chemical warhead which falls on European territory; in the assessment of the two Polish authors, those risks could be extremely high.

• The decision-making procedures concerning the possibly extremely short leadtimes for intercepting a hostile missile over European territory have to be discussed and fixed with the owner on whose territory the interceptors are located, and possibly within the NATO framework as well. The strong concerns reportedly expressed by the current Polish government 40 are likely to become relevant for all countries hosting MD-related installations in the future.

• The term defensive, which in its literally non-offensive meaning is doubted by a number of experts in this project, needs to be assessed by the democracies inSee Ian Davis, NATO and Missile Defence: Stay Tuned This Could Get Interesting, BASIC Notes: Occasional Papers

on International Security Policy (London: British American Security Information Council, 30 June 2004), available at:

http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2004NATOMissileDefence-IstanbulSummit.htm; see also Kubbig, Raketenabwehrsystem MEADS: Entscheidung getroffen, viele Fragen offen, op. cit.

40 See Der Spiegel, No. 31, 31 July 2006, p.87.

volved. Everts implicitly notes that the interpretation of this meaning can be questioned, although its ‘purely defensive’ nature ought to be obvious in order to be accepted by the public, be it in principle or in concrete situations. This regarded for instance the delivery of German Patriots to Israel and Turkey in the context of the last Iraq war.

But this does not mean that ‘purely defensive’ scenarios are not possible in principle – the Patriots fielded in Israel during the last two Gulf Wars with the Israeli government being passive would be an example. Beier juxtaposes the relatively passive and explicitly defensive posture of NORAD (which has the support of the Canadian people) and the potentially offensive character of MD schemes (to which the majority of the public in Canada has objected). This contrast becomes even more true, if one puts the seemingly defensive posture of MD in the context of military pre-emption, as Domisiewicz/Kamiński do with respect to MD bases in Poland, which could become engaged in a pre-emptive attack for instance against Iran. If this became reality – would such interventions, especially if they were not authorised by the UN Security Council – not pervert ‘purely defensive’ systems into utterly offensive ones? This in turn raises the question of the conditions under which democracies equipped with all variants of MD would become intervention-prone.





The broader and much more principled question has to be seen against this backdrop: Are MD schemes conceivable that live truly up to the standard of being ‘purely defensive’ and that constitute a basis for the foreign policy identity of democracies or an ensemble of democratic states in the framework of NATO or the EU? This broader and much more principled question follows from the ‘purely defensive’ scenarios. Two aspects are relevant. First, some countries will at some point face this question when the issue of integrating their systems into the global architecture as envisioned by the United States is on the agenda; this applies for instance to the Netherlands and Germany, which have embarked on anti-tactical systems such as the Patriot or MEADS for the primary protection of troops. For it is this very architecture which raises the old question of triggering an arms race again especially with China.

Second, the defensive feature of democracies is linked to the question of war and peace, defined as the inclination to intervene. 41 This does not only apply to the pre-emptive/preventive concept of the almost unconstrained US hegemony, but especially to the foreign policy identity in transition of formerly clear-cut civilian/trading powers. Not only has the traditional hegemon ceased to exist. Many civilian/trading powers as we have known them have, too. Their civilian predisposition being the subject of transformation processes, have become weaker. Even Denmark understands itself as a strategic, i.e. militarily more active democracy, not to mention Germany and Japan who want to resume a greater role by dispatching their troops protected with MD. Whether this variant of MD makes a country more intervention-prone or leads to greater scepticism in the debates and decision-making processes at home - as it may generate a false sense of security for the soldiers in WMD hostile environments - remains an open question.

41 In this respect the comparative MD project does not only add specific aspects to the arms control/race behaviour of democracies, but to their willingness (not) to intervene as well. On the latter aspect see Anna Geis, Lothar Brock, and Harald Müller, Democratic Wars. Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace (Houndmills/Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

4. Research Perspectives The findings and problems presented in this project could and should be extended (and maybe corrected or complemented) by including other democracies such as Australia and Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Italy and Spain. One interesting aspect that has not been examined here is whether the politico-ideological affinity especially between the Bush administration and some smaller democracies could turn out to be an additional factor in explaining the MD policies of democracies.

The problems listed above and the two major key terms in several contributions – rising China and outer space – suggest a research setting that goes beyond the linear extension of democracies by including the interaction with non-democratic states which are seen as a threat to the democratic countries. Not only China (as mentioned in several contributions), but Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea may be examined in this connection. The issue area of missiles and defences should, as (indirectly) suggested in a number of articles, be extended to the topic of space and its weaponisation/militarisation. 42 Three major research questions, which also put the democracy topic into new contexts,

come to mind:

• How is the conflict potential to be assessed in view of the rising states (economically and technologically) and in terms of their ‘rising’ rocket and space-faring capabilities (China, 43 India, 44 Iran 45): Are those theories right which automatically associate major risks with such rising powers? 46 Does it make a difference for the risk analysis whether these rising states are democracies or not?

• Given the unique position of the United States and the range of foreign policy options available to secure its monopoly position, 47 and in view of the possible 42 See Götz Neuneck and André Rothkirch, Rüstungskontrolle im Weltraum: Technologie, Transparenz und Vertrauensbildung, in: Götz Neuneck and Christian Mölling (eds), Die Zukunft der Rüstungskontrolle (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 367-383; Space Security 2004 and 2005. Executive Summary, available at: www.spacesecurity.org.

43 See for instance Gill Bates and Gudrun Wacker (eds), China’s Rise: Diverging U.S.-EU Perceptions and Approaches (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005).

44 See in this context Gautam Adhikari, India and America: Estranged No More; in: Current History, Vol. 103, No. 672 (April 2004), pp. 158-164 (Special Issue on South and Southeast Asia); Gurcharan Das, The Indian Model, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (July-August 2006), pp. 2-16; Benjamin Schreer and Christian Wagner, Amerikanisch-indische Sicherheitsbeziehungen. Aufbruch zu einer neuen „Ära“? (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005).

45 See for example Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction (no place of publication indicated, 2006); Cirincione with Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, op. cit., pp. 83-118; Andrew Feickert, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, in: Steven A. Hildreth (Coordinator), Missile Defense: The Current Debate, pp. 6-10 (Washington, D.C.: Report of the Congressional Research Service, July 2005); Shannon N. Kile (ed.), Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-proliferation, SIPRI Research Report No. 21 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); various contributions in: Bernd W. Kubbig, Axel Nitsche, Carolin Anthes, and Sascha Knaus (eds), The Nuclea-rization of the Broader Middle East as a Challenge for Transatlantic Policy Coordination. Documentation of the Second Transatlantic Conference on the Broader Middle East in Berlin, March 2006 (organised by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt – Documentation is available at PRIF); National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: Ausländische Raketenentwicklungen und die Bedrohung durch ballistische Raketen bis 2015 [Washington D.C., Dezember 2001 (public summary), available at: http://www.hsfk.de/abm/back/ docs/nie2001.pdf].

46 See on this representatives of the (neo-)realist International Relations Theory such as Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers.

Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York/London Norton, 2001).

47 See Bernd W. Kubbig, Introduction: The US Hegemon in the ‘American Century.’ The State of the Art and the German Contributions, in: id. (Guest Editor.) Toward a New American Century? The US Hegemon in Motion, Amerikastudien/ American Studies, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2001 (Special Issue), pp. 495-524; David A. Lake, Entangling Relations. American Foreign Policy in its Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 24-31; Niall Ferguson and Robert Kagan, The United States Is, and Should Be, an Empire. A New Atlantic Initiative Debate, (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, July 17, 2003, available at: http://www.aei.org/events/ risks from rising states: Which are the best strategies to reduce or avoid conflict without jeopardising the security of the democratic countries? Which problems and prospects arise for the policy co-ordination of the ‘sole superpower’ and traditionally civilian/trading powers?

• What are the conditions of and chances for arms control in the missile (defence) and space area? Is it conceivable that the proliferation of missiles and of MDs could advance at such a great pace (and get increasingly intertwined) that it becomes attractive to revitalise the current Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles – or that far-reaching and radical proposals such as Ronald Reagan’s global zero option for missiles across the board as well as regional approaches for missiles free zones become part of a serious agenda? How about the prospects for corresponding arms control proposals in space? What role is MD likely to play in the context of a ballistic missiles free zone? Would MD enhance or hamper such a zone?



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