«“BUT MOM, CROP-TOPS ARE CUTE!” SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE Sally Haslanger MIT, Department of Linguistics and ...»
Others, such as John Searle (1995), have higher demands, including controversial “we-intentions,” assignment of function, and the generation of constitutive rules.
90 Sally Haslanger These elements are more plausibly required in creating institutional facts or conventional facts; his analysis is too demanding to capture much of ordinary informal social life. E.g., we can have coordinated intentions without them being “we-intentions;” things can have a social function even if they aren’t assigned it;
and social kind membership isn’t always governed by rules.
9. As Howard (1994) notes, the concept of a sociocognitive schema, leaves many questions unanswered, e.g., how and when are such schemas formed both in the individual and in the culture? What explains their formation and disruption? How are they transposed? (etc.)
10. See: http://www.blueofthesky.com/publicart/works/joanofarc.htm
11. There are complexities I won’t address in how to interpret Ginger’s utterance of Fred’s original sentence, e.g., is she denying Fred’s token utterance or the proposition he is expressing? Note, however, that even if we allow the “hidden indexical” to continue to track Fred, Ginger succeeds in disagreeing, but her claim is false, not true: It is not the case that this oatmeal is-yummy-to-Fred.
12. More needs to be said about the individual who offers a critique that is at odds with the operative social structure. This, after all, is the feminist critic whose intervention is the real subject of this essay. Although the proposal I’ve developed characterizes the individual’s social milieu as the one operative in the context for that individual—even if it is not endorsed or internalized—the possibility of being at odds with this operative structure is important for thinking about the location of social critique.
13. Drawing on Longino’s analysis of scientific objectivity, one might, e.g., privilege milieus that meet certain standards for the diversity of and equal consideration of epistemic agents. (Longino 1990)
14. This sort of idea can also be found in MacFarlane 2006.
Cadinu, M., Anne Maass, Alessandra Rosabianca, Jeff Kiesner. 2005. Why do women underperform under stereotype threat? Evidence for the role of negative thinking. Psychological Science 16(7), 572–578.
Elster, J. 1985. Making sense of Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fields, Barbara Jean. 1982. Ideology and race in American history. In Region, Race and Reconstruction, ed., J. M. Kousser and J. M. McPherson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 143–177.
Fredrickson, B., Tomi-Ann Roberts, Stephanie M. Noll, Diane M. Quinn, Jean M. Twenge. 1998.
That swimsuit becomes you: sex differences in self-objectification, restrained eating, and math performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75(1): 269–284.
Geuss, Raymond. 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giddens, Anthony. 1979. Central Problems in Social Theory: Action Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press.
———. 1984. The Constitution of Society: An Outline of a Theory of Structuration. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Haslanger, S. 2003. Social construction: the “debunking” project. In Socializing Metaphysics:
The Nature of Social Reality, ed., Frederick F. Schmitt. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 301–325.
“But Mom, Crop-Tops Are Cute!” 91 Howard, Judith A. 1994. A social cognitive conception of social structure, Social Psychology Quarterly 57, no. 3: 210–227.
¨ Kolbel, Max. 2003. Faultless disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 53–73.
Langton, Rae. 2007. “Speaker’s freedom and maker’s knowledge.” Manuscript.
Lasersohn, P. 2005. Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.
Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643–686.
Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Longino, H. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
MacFarlane, J. 2007. Relativism and disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132:1 (January): 17–31.
———. 2005. Making sense of relative truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 321–39.
———. 2004. The assessment sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology. URL: http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/macfarlane/relknow.pdf ———. 2003. Future contingents and relative truth. The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 321–36.
MacKinnon, C. 1989. Towards a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Marx, Karl. 1970/1846. The German Ideology. Ed. C. J. Arthur. New York: International Publishers.
McCarthy, Thomas. 1990. The critique of impure reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt school.
Political Theory 18, no. 3: 437–469.
Purvis, Trevor and Alan Hunt. 1993. Discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology... The British Journal of Sociology 44, no 3: 473–499.
Searle, J. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press.
Sewell, William H., Jr. 1992. A theory of structure: duality, agency and transformation. The American Journal of Sociology 98: no. 1: 1–29.
Shelby, Tommie. 2003. Ideology, racism and critical social theory. The Philosophical Forum 34, no. 2: 153–188.
Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M., and Quinn, D.M. 1999. Stereotype threat and women’s math performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 4–28.
Taylor, C. 1985/1971. Interpretation and the sciences of man. In Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Warner, J. 2007. “Hot tots and moms hot to trot,” New York Times, March 17, final edition, p. 15.
Williams, B. 1973. Deciding to believe. In Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136–151.