«Does Enclave Deliberation Polarize Opinions? ¨ ¨¨ Kimmo Gronlund • Kaisa Herne • Maija Setala Published online: 8 February 2015 Ó The ...»
As pointed out by theorists of deliberative democracy, all arguments should not have an equal weight in processes of public reasoning. Most notably, reasonable arguments appealing to generalizable moral principles should be powerful, whereas arguments based on attitudes such as prejudice should be ‘laundered’ in the course of deliberation (see e.g. Goodin 1986). Liberal tendencies may have been reinforced 1016 Polit Behav (2015) 37:995–1020 in the experiment because certain arguments against immigration were such that they could not be put forward or sustained in the deliberative process. The effects of preference laundering are likely to be particularly strong in an issue such as immigration where people’s basic rights are at stake. Naturally, in order to gain more conclusive support for this kind of an assumption, the experiment should be replicated (a) on different types of issues and (b) in different political contexts.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank participants of several conferences and workshops
for valuable comments and suggestions, most notably at the panel ‘Inequalities in Political Knowledge:
Individual and Contextual Determinants’ at the IPSA World Congress in Madrid in July 2012, at the panel ‘Racial Prejudice’ at the WPSA Annual Meeting in Los Angeles in March 2013, at the panel ‘The Effects of Interpersonal Discussion and Deliberation’ at the MPSA Annual Meeting in Chicago in April 2013, and at the panel ‘The Quality of Deliberation’ at the ECPR General Conference in Bordeaux in September
2013. We are also grateful for the comments made by Prof. Lauri Karvonen, Prof. Peter Esaiasson, Prof.
Marc Hooghe, the four anonymous referees as well as the Editors of Political Behavior. The experiment was funded by the Academy of Finland (Grant No. 251222) and the Centre of Excellence, ‘Democracy: A ˚ Citizen Perspective’ at Abo Akademi University. The authors owe a debt of gratitude to the whole team behind the implementation of the experiment, especially Staffan Himmelroos, Marina Lindell, Lauri Rapeli, Maija Karjalainen and Kim Strandberg.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.
Appendix 1 The main items measuring attitudes on immigration
1. Finland should take more immigrants. Do you think this is a bad or a good suggestion?
2. Migration of foreigners into Finland should be restricted as long as there is unemployment in Finland. [r]
3. Do you think Finland will change into a better or a worse place to live when people from other countries move to Finland? (Questions 1–3 were presented on a scale from 0 to 10)
4. It is good for the Finnish economy that people from other countries move to Finland
5. Immigrants take away jobs from native Finns. [r]
6. Immigrants should have the same right to social security as Finns even if they are not Finnish citizens
7. The state and the municipalities use too much money to aid immigrants. [r]
8. Immigration poses a serious threat to our national originality
9. Everyone who wants to come to Finland to live and work should be allowed to do so
10. Immigration policy should primarily favor Christians instead of other religions. [r]
11. Generally speaking, immigrants adapt well into the Finnish society
12. I would be happy to have an immigrant as a co-worker
13. I would accept an immigrant as a family member
14. I would accept immigrants in my neighborhood. (Questions 3–14 were presented as a standard Likert scale with four values) [r] = Reversed coding in the sum variable
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